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In this paper, an argument is developed in favour of further integration of 
“Europe” and, most importantly, its increased “politicization”. It is not based 
on any romantic or idealistic vision of a positive European cultural identity, 
but on an assessment of Europe’s reality as already integrated economically, 
socially and ecologically, however lagging behind politically in terms of de-
mocratic government and citizenship. The seemingly endless discussions about 
Europe’s identity, limit, unity, civilization, etc. are not a problem that is yet to 
be solved, but are, precisely, the core of what makes Europe what it is: a plural-
ity in unity instead of a “unity in plurality”, as one of the official slogans of the 
European Union (EU) has it. Current social, economic and environmental prob-
lems require European solutions as well as a more active European citizenship. 
However, European civil identity that is to match European societal reality, will 
not be a unitary and homogeneous identity, but heterogeneous and diverse, co-
vering a plurality of perceptions, preferences and ideals – it will be plural, not 
as a first step towards unity, but in its core; and it will be divided, but not along 
national lines.
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“The idea of a ‘return to Europe’ differs profoundly from the slip of the 
tongue common among Western European commentators, in which the en-
largement of the EU becomes the ‘expansion of Europe’”, Ralf Ragowski, 
Charles Turner (Rogowski, Turner 2006: 19).
“<…> the problem of politics is not identification, but identification and its 
failure”, Ernesto Laclau, Lilian Zac (Laclau, Zac 1994: 35).
“There was a positive choice in the “no”: the choice of the choice itself”,  
Slavoj Žižek (Žižek 2008: 270).
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Introduction
If “we”1 are to judge by printed and televised media, citizens of many European 
countries have become more “euro-sceptic” and perhaps even “euro-phobic” over the 
last couple of years. The Dutch and French “no” to a constitutional treaty has been fol-
lowed by an Irish “no”, and the attempts by the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, to 
compensate Czech EU presidency by a stronger financial policy show a lack of politi-
cal will to “go for Europe”.The recent Eastward and Southward enlargement – the Baltic 
states, Romania and Bulgaria, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia – is experienced by many as a 
form of “expansion”; relatively recent member-states such as Poland, Czech Republic 
and Hungary have lost much of their initial enthusiasm, and many people in established 
EU member-states fear the free flow of labour force from the new member states, not to 
mention the dread associated with the leaky walls of “fortress Europe”. The EU seems 
to be experienced, by many, though certainly not all, as an inevitable phenomenon that 
is at best convenient, but does not generate any warm sentiments: at the level of political 
passions, Europe is lukewarm at best2.
Contrary to these apparent tendencies, I want to develop in this paper an argument 
in favour of a gradual further integration of “Europe” and, most of all, in favour of an 
increased “politicization”. My argument is not, however, based on any romantic or ideal-
istic vision of a positive European cultural identity, let alone a “civilizational” European 
mission. On the contrary, it is based on the following three considerations, two of them 
realistic and one idealistic, but not per se European: (i) an integrated Europe is an eco-
nomic, social and ecological reality already and increasingly so, but it is not matched 
by a political structure that allows Europeans to address their common problems; (ii) 
there is a relatively coherent and delineated European “identity”, even if its borders are 
unclear and even if it has to be defined in negative rather than positive terms; (iii) there 
is a positive ideal, call it “democratic”, of self-government or self-determination that I 
subscribe to, and that is hampered rather than promoted by the current political state of 
Europe. As Žižek recently put it: “So, although the French and Dutch “no” is not sus-
tained by a coherent and detailed alternative vision, it at least clears the space for it… 
<…> It is time for us, citizens of Europe, to become aware that we have to make a prop-erly political decision about what we want. No enlightened administrator will do the job 
for us” (Žižek 2008: 276).
It is important to emphasize what I am not doing in this paper. I am not engaged in 
an attempt to offer a blueprint for a better or more democratic Europe – rather I try to 
articulate a few principles against which any such model or proposal should be meas-
ured. Secondly, I am not working towards stating a positive European identity – rather 
I try to point out how the discussion about identity is fundamentally misled if it seeks 
to articulate identity “positively”. Thirdly, my aim is not to develop a “political philoso-
1 Throughout this paper, “we” means all people who positively identify with the idea of an integrated Europe 
(regardless of its territorial delineations and of the degree and form of unification – alliance, confederation, 
federation, unitary state, etc.); this “we” can thus be understood as “a European dèmos in the making”.
2 See Evert van der Zweerde 2008.
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phy for Europe” – rather I try to develop a number of notions and ideas that, though 
European in terms of their historical background and no doubt “euro-centric” in some 
respects3 intentionally point beyond Europe (or any other continent) to a “universal” 
political philosophy which can be applied, among others, to Europe. In the first section, 
I offer a brief outline of this political philosophy. In the next sections (2–10), I develop 
argumentative lines that in the concluding section (11) are brought together in a posi-
tion that, hopefully, is as inspiring as it is realistic. The inspiration will contribute, I 
hope, to an extension and intensification of the “we” referred to in the first sentence of 
this introduction; the realism will, preferably, make this “we” more influential – even 
if I do not think that it is up to me, as a political philosopher, to seek direct political 
influence.
1. Political philosophy – a brief outline
Of course, the space of this section does not allow for more than a succinct and rather 
schematic outline of what I think could be a viable conception of political philoso-
phy. It is based on the following principles – each of which here has the status of an 
assumption.
i. I assume that “politics”, in the broad sense of that term, refers to many possible 
and actual forms of dealing with “the political”, and the latter I define as “the di-
mension of possible conflict that is intrinsic to and therefore ineradicable in all (in-
cluding discursive and symbolic) forms of social human life”. “Dealing with”, in 
this context, can mean many different things, including denying and overlooking, 
but it cannot mean “effectively doing away with”. In this sense, the political, un-
derstood as the possibility of conflict, is objectively there. The notion of “politics” 
covers many things, from contesting social movements to political parties, from 
micro-politics in organizations to the macro-politics of bodies like the EU, and 
from a Solomon’s judgment to settle a dispute among children to the constitutions 
of European polities. If “politics” is an umbrella term to cover the “forms of deal-
ing with the political”, the proper object of political philosophy must be “politics 
and the political” in their intertwinement.
ii. Conflict is, essentially, the conflict between “powers”, i.e. actualized potentialities 
(latin potentiae, french puissances). In human society, these powers come in many 
forms: physical force, economic power (“buying power”), psychic force (indoctri-
nation), persuasive force (including temptation), disciplinary power, rational force 
(the power of the better argument), etc. Political power (latin potestas, french pou-
voir) is a specific type of power that organizes the other forms, sometimes by using 
them, sometimes by channelling them, sometimes by transforming them, some-
times by generating them, sometimes by counteracting or oppressing them, but 
always subordinating them to itself and thus always bound up with them – there is 
3 In my view, the judgement concerning the X-centric nature of some phenomenon can never be left to X – there 
even is something hypocritical in attempts to articulate one’s own X-centeredness: if you can articulate it, 
you might as well overcome it.
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no such thing as pure political power. Political power is necessary in any society4
in order to reduce the conflict potential of the existing forms of power, without 
ever being able to annihilate this potential and, in fact, introducing a new source 
of possible conflict, namely precisely between political power and other forms. 
Political power is generally, though not necessarily, and therefore not always, in 
the interest of the otherwise less powerful – political power thus can indeed be 
seen as an ideal in its own right (Kangaspuro 2007: 12). Seen from this angle, de-
mocracy is good inasmuch as it entails maximum transformation of social power 
(the power of the multitude) into political power of the dèmos (Wiesner 2007: 46f); 
political rights and liberties are good inasmuch as they allow for the bottom-up 
articulation of potentially conflicting forces and their transformation into political 
conflict. Consequently, liberal democracy is not a bonum in se, but the arguably 
most promising type of polity for the transformation of societal conflict into politi-
cal struggle5.
iii. Political power can be both legitimate and illegitimate, i.e. legitimacy is a qual-
ity that political power can have, but legitimate political power is not sui generis: 
the legitimacy of political power stems from a source other than this power itself. 
Major candidates are, of course, the will of the people, e.g. as expressed in elec-
tions, and law, esp. constitutional law. However, these are not “absolute” sources of 
legitimacy, but only within the context of a liberal-democratic Rechtsstaat. To this 
can be added, as a secondary source of legitimacy, the effective success of politi-
cal power in organizing the other forms of power, such as violence and economic 
power: an effective monopoly on the use of violence, for example, can increase the 
legitimacy of political power just as its failure to exclude violence from society can 
reduce it. At this point, however, one must be careful not to confuse legitimacy 
and efficacy: as anti-terrorist policies show, it is very well possible to have efficacy 
without legitimacy – this is also why legitimacy is not to be confused with popular 
acceptance. Illegitimate political power reverts to apolitical power, i.e. it becomes 
mere force.
iv. The actual power structure of society, including the political power that organizes 
it, can never exhaust the dimension of possible conflict within society, because 
it is, itself, an effect of the execution or application of pre-political power, which 
transforms itself into political power in the very execution. As the institution of 
political power is, by definition, a transformation of pre-political power, this trans-
formation itself cannot be an effect of political power, as there is no political power 
before the transformation takes place. This is another way of saying that political 
power, despite the fact that, once constituted, it becomes itself productive, is al-
ways and necessarily the organization of something pre-existing, and this some-
4 This is not an a priori exclusion of anarchism, which, to my mind, does not deny political power, but any 
asymmetrical distribution of it.
5 At this point, I derive my inspiration from the idea of “agonistic democracy”, elaborated by theorists like 
Chantal Mouffe, Iris Marion Young, and William Connolly; see, for example, Young 2000, p. 49f.
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thing thus must be ontologically prior to it. And this is another way of stating the 
primacy of the social over politics. The consequence of this is that political power, 
irrespective of its capacity and scope, is always and necessarily re-active: it can 
repress and oppress, it can control and canalize, but it cannot encapsulate or incor-
porate all forms of power. There is an ontological limit to political power – even 
if it is not per se clear where this limit. If existing powers, i.e. at the ontic level, 
transgress this limit, apolitical power comes in at the other end in the form of tyr-
anny, intrigue, etc.
v. Politics can never exhaust the political, i.e. there is always a remainder, a moment 
of “pure”, arbitrary and by definition illegitimate power exercise. This is why any 
decision, any form of politics, any power constellation can always be contested. 
There is, consequently, an irreducible gap between a concrete constellation of po-
litical and other powers, and its acceptance as natural, divinely sanctioned or his-
torically necessary, and this gap is bridged by ideology which can be defined as 
any self-concealing mechanism of justification (motivation/legitimization) of past, 
present or future action and/or state of affairs through unwarranted claims and 
images, concerning non-experiential entities (typical examples being the People, 
the Nation, the Party, Reason etc.). Ideological formations can make a “jump”, e.g. 
in claiming that a capitalist market economy is natural or that the hegemony of 
liberal democracy, at least as an idea, marks the end of history, but they also can 
claim the opposite of social reality. Soviet ideology, for example, claimed that all 
Soviet citizens were engaged in the construction of a socialist society.
vi. If the possibility of conflict is intrinsic to society, if, therefore, the fundamental 
tension in politically organized society is that between political power and the free 
play of forces, each of which pre- supposes and restricts the other, if, consequently, 
the question is not whether, but how these two should be related to each other 
(which is the question of the capacity (Tilly 2007: 15f) – scope, impact, etc. – of 
political power vis-à-vis non-political powers, including those generated by po-
litical power itself, e.g. bureaucracy), and if, finally, the existing constellation of 
powers can never be “fixed”, but is always and necessarily a matter of checking 
and balancing, then the primary task of political philosophers is to point out these 
fundamental relations and constellations, rather than to suggest either a solution of 
this tension or to “sublate” the existing tensions to a higher-level synthesis. There 
is no end to politics, because the political is ineradicable – where this disappears 
from sight, politics must be reinvented.
It is from these five assumptions, briefly outlined here, that I approach the “politi-
cal state of Europe”6.
6 I use “state” in this context not in the traditional sense of the nation-state, but in the broader sense of the 
juridical-political state – or: condition of a given polity. Étienne Balibar poses the question as follows: “…la 
question… sur laquelle… nous devrions continuer à réfléchir, est la suivante: Qu’est-ce que l’État aujourd’hui 
en Europe ?” and he specifies that he does not mean any kind of ‘European state’, but the actual constellation 
of state functions : “il s’agit de demander… ce que deviant tendanciellement, et comment se comporte, quel-
les functions remplit l’État dans l’espace européen” (Balibar 2001: 236).
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2. Borders in and of Europe
The first topic to address in this connection is that of borders. Białystok, like 
Białowieża, both locations of recent conferences on Europe and its borders, is located 
near the border of the EU. This border is, in many respects, an edge: it is sharp and it 
can hurt physically, morally and emotionally. First of all, it is the border between two 
political spaces, the EU and bordering non-EU Europe (in this case, Belarus), and in 
this capacity it is much sharper than any border within the EU. Citizens cannot sim-
ply cross it. It is a place where the EU protects its political space against illegal im-
migration (it has delegated this task to the Polish government, providing the means 
to execute it), and it separates different political systems, one based on the idea of 
individual rights and freedoms, the other on the denial of these principles. Secondly, 
this border is an economic one as becomes clear from the extensive trade, legal and 
illegal, across it. It separates different economic systems, it separates the protect-
ed inner common market (including labour market) of the EU from the economic 
space of the heirs of the Soviet economic space, and, last but certainly not least, it 
separates relative wealth from relative poverty. Even if this border is not impenetra-
ble, it is still clear-cut. Political borders are “cut” because they result from “cision”. 
They are not, however, mere symbolic constructions: borders are always also made 
of wood, concrete, steel, floodlight etc., and they are always also physical barriers, 
that can stop bodies from moving from one place to another. This is different from 
cultural, ethnic and religious borders: the borders between cultural traditions, ethnic 
composition and religious affiliation are rarely clear-cut, in fact, they are very rarely 
“cut” – they rather cut across society in many different, overlapping and fragmented 
ways and they are discursive and symbolic as much, or more, as they are tangible. In 
some places, a Huntingtonian fault line between civilizations – between the Western-
Christian and the Orthodox worlds, for example – may be almost visibly present, but 
even there it is not as sharp as the border between countries, which, if there is a need, 
can be established very exactly.
If, following Niklas Luhmann and Anthony Giddens, we conceive of society as a 
continuum, i.e. as a world society by default, we can perceive all these borders as cut-
ting across society, creating new divisions and differences, rather than expressing ex-
isting ones (Luhmann 2000: 220; Giddens 1999: 16). This clearly applies to Europe: 
borders have always shifted in the course of its history, and any attempt to establish 
borders, that would match pre-existing objective differences is bound to fail – rather, 
borders organize and establish differences as such. As a result, such borders, even if 
we accept them as facts of life, necessarily retain an aspect of artificiality and con-
testability. In fact, I think, that it is difficult to find in Europe (to which this discus-
sion limits itself) borders that could not be reasonably contested by individuals and 
groups, living near them. The first conclusion is that in Europe no border is self-ev-
idently given (with the possible exception of sea shores). Consequently, discourses – 
political, scientific, philosophical, and folk – are developed to either justify or ques-
tion the existence or precise location of such borders. These discourses become more 
important and hence forceful – potentially even aggressive – as the borders are less 
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obvious and, therefore, have to be actively drawn by participants. This is the case 
with the border of the EU. Discourse about “European identity” and about the “lim-
its” of enlargement is so complex and discordant because neither of them is obvious 
and both are a matter of self-determination of a very complex “agent” – they cannot 
therefore serve as the foundation of real, i.e. physical borders, and yet something has 
to serve as such.
3. European discursive space 
Any discourse occurs in a concrete situation and is developed from a position within 
a field. Obviously, this situation and this position themselves can become objects of 
deliberation and discussion, which makes the situation reflexive. There is no exter-
nal, let alone Archimedean, point from which issues about society, including those 
that concern the borders that cut across it, can be addressed. Discourse is local and 
immanent by definition. This is not to deny that there is a dimension of generality and 
universality that goes beyond the situation in which discourse is developed; but it is to 
argue, and emphatically so, that this is a movement out of that situation – the move-
ment of thought is one of transcending an initial immanence. In this respect, society 
can be present as an object of discourse, e.g. in social science or in politics, but it never is an object: it is always a subject-object that, in a disharmonious multitude of 
discourses and meta-discourses, speaks about itself. From a sociological perspective 
that means to Luhmann’s words: „Eine Gesellschaft, die sich selbst beschreibt, tut dies 
intern, aber so, als ob es von außen wäre“ (Luhmann 1997: 15). From a philosophical 
perspective, however, this “speaking about itself” must be understood as a form of 
reflexivity, i.e. the relation between “internal” and “external”, is itself internal.
Discourse takes place in what I suggest to call discursive space. In contrast with 
physical space or spatial environment, discursive space is both infinite and limited 
in a specific manner. It is filled – with “discourse”, obviously – at the very moment 
of its generation: even if it is empty, it is filled with meaningful silence (there is a 
difference between empty discursive space and absence of such space). Moreover, 
any “stretch” of discursive space can only be filled in one particular way. At the 
same time, it is infinite: any point in discursive space can be the starting point of a 
new stretch. By way of imperfect illustration, compare it with text balloons in com-
ics (especially the less “mainstream” ones – I am thinking of such authors as Gotlib 
or Greg): they can have any size, take any shape, have layers and be filled with any 
content, including “emptiness”, but they are always connected to some point in physi-
cal space, i.e. to one of the figures in a picture (of course, they can also “float” in the 
air – but in that case they are meaningfully not linked to a speaker).
When filled, discursive space obtains a “materiality” of its own – this is why 
“official talk”, however shallow or void of meaning it may be (think of the langue 
de bois produced in the former Soviet bloc, but more generally think of any type of 
official discourse or propaganda), is never without significance: although discursive 
space is infinite in the sense that any filling of it can be compensated or matched, 
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hidden or drowned, it is limited in the sense, that its filling cannot be “undone”. 
Therefore, even empty talk has a certain significance. It means that serious talk, at 
the same time and place, in the same communicative situation, has to affirm itself 
against it. Typically, different instances of discourse fight over the same discursive 
space, despite the fact that new discursive spaces can be opened infinitely. It is this 
materiality of discourse, together with its always having a “real” source as well as 
“real” addresses – “people” – that precludes any understanding of discourse as in-
nocent hot air, and that excludes any conception of discourse analysis as dealing with 
mere symbolic constructions. These “constructions” please or hurt human beings of 
not only mind, but also flesh and blood, and they express their real opinions, needs, 
wants, ideals and anxieties. Names do hurt, albeit not in the same manner as sticks 
or stones, and “hate speech” (or “love talk” for that matter) is not a metaphorical ex-
pression. Consequently, discursive space is not only a place of exchange and expres-
sion, but also of contestation and struggle.
One thing that can be assessed against this background is that there is in Europe 
a multitude of often conflicting discourses about Europe and these discourses do not 
simply co-exist, let alone peacefully. Academic conferences are, of course, one part 
of them. One way to describe a conference is as a place where various discursive and 
argumentative lines touch upon each other in conflict, convergence and overlap, thus 
creating, at least for some time, a new discursive situation. Participating in a confer-
ence is one way of transcending one’s own being-situated, obviously with a varying 
degree of success. If, however, we realize that, for example, scholarly journals and 
academic research projects often arise from conferences, it is clear that conferences 
are nodal points in the development of discursive and argumentative networks. They 
not only open up new spaces, they also organize and structure them.
At the same time, they are only one type of nodal point within discursive space: 
discourses not only conflict with each other, very often they remain simply indepen-
dent from each other or are only connected in indirect ways. And there are many 
such nodal points and networks. A hypothesis that follows from these considerations is that we may already be in the process of genesis of a European discursive space,
without necessarily being aware of it (i.e., the process does not depend on our aware-
ness of it, even though it does make a difference). This space is filled with a multi-
tude of discourses, but it is not a unitary space that can be surveyed from a vantage 
point outside it. One consequence of this is that the exploration of this European dis-
cursive space necessarily involves “hermeneutics”, since the meaning of discourse is 
never given without its context. However, the fact that discursive space is never har-
monious has the further consequence that participants – those who generate discourse 
and those at whom it is addressed in a given context – do not have an exclusive right 
to determine the meaning of discourse. One and the same speech, for example, can 
both express the cultural heritage of a particular people and violate the rights to cul-
tural expression of an ethnic minority, irrespective of whether it is meant to do so. To 
be sure, this is not an argument in favour of relativism: participants can and should 
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always broaden the horizon of understanding both their own and others’ discourse, 
even if this understanding never becomes “perfect”.
4. Reflexivity and identity
The notion of discursive space leads to the question, from which position this paper 
then is written? This is not an irrelevant question, if discourse about “Europe” by
Europeans is a part of Europe. To be sure, this does not imply a “partisan” position; 
it rather implies a reflexive one: it means to be aware of the practical dimension of 
intellectual discussion. I cannot and ought not deny that I speak and write from the 
relatively comfortable and safe position of an academic, from one of the members 
of the “first generation” European community (Benelux and European Community 
of Coal and Steel). My position thus is an established European one. When asked to 
define my own approach, I would describe it as a reflexive realism that, in a world 
full of idealizing and simplifying discursive constructions, out of necessity includes 
deconstruction as a political ideal (this, however, is a specific and not a neutral posi-
tion). The aim of deconstruction, it should be noted, is not destruction or cantanker-
ousness, but the making available of construction elements for new constructions. To 
give an example: it is not destructive, but constructive to analyze the contradictions, 
contained in frequently heard expressions like “What kind of Europe do we want?” 
because they wrongly suggest that “Europe” is something like a given object of pos-
sible volitions and because it, wrongly again, suggests that there already is such a 
“we”, while in fact this “we” would precisely have to be the outcome of a particular 
kind of yet-to-emerge Europe. As Claudia Wiesner rightly states, a “European iden-
tity”, and the European dèmos that it defines, are conditions, but not pre-conditions 
of European democratization (Wiesner 2007: 35–38). There thus is an unwarranted 
“jump”, contained in the “we” of the question itself – and this is what makes such 
questions ideological (see above, 1.v). However, once thus deconstructed, we can use 
the same question to point out that, by posing the question and trying to answer it, 
a particular kind of Europe is already being made, irrespective of what “we” want. 
In asserting, then, that European society is not the object of a given collective sub-
ject, one contributes – I contribute, in this case – to the coming-to-be of Europe as a 
subjective-objective reality. This is a reflexive realization of what is going on.
The critical focus on this and similar questions is, more generally, a part of an at-
tempt to understand from a participant’s perspective the reality of European – my, our 
reality, the reality of this discursive community (conference audience, author-cum-
readers) as part of Europe. It does make sense to ask, for example, how far Europe 
extends culturally or “civilizationally”; it does make sense to relate this question to 
such questions as to whether Turkey, Tunisia or Ukraine should or should not at some 
point be accepted as members; and it does make sense to link this question to a 
discussion about the parameters of European identity. Just as it does make sense, 
obviously, what kind of immigration policy, Human Rights policy or environmen-
tal policy we, European citizens, prefer. But it is more relevant from a philosophi-
14 Evert van der Zweerde. “Plurality in Unity”: European Identity and European Citizenship
cal point of view to realize that “Europe” is precisely the discursive space in which 
these questions are being posed in the first place and in which, by trying to “find out” 
what this notorious “European identity” is that we allegedly “have”, we identify as 
Europeans. In other words: it is also by disagreeing about such issues, that “we” takes 
shape, which implies that the identity of this “we” is not homogeneous but heteroge-
neous and conflict-ridden.
If identity is not a pre-given “thing” that can be “found” or discovered, but a 
construction that stems from processes of self-identification and other-identification 
(Mouffe 2005: 25–29; Laclau, Zac 1994: 31–35), i.e. something that is performative 
rather than empirical, then it is the joint-yet-differentiated search for such an iden-
tity which is the very “identity” and which generates the “imagined community” 
(Anderson 2006) that “shares” this identity. Put more radically: to ask “Who are we?” 
or “Which identity do we have?” is not to embark on a quest or to announce a dis-
covery, but to establish oneself as a self-constituting subject seeking community with 
others. An important consequence of this discussion is that “European” as an iden-
tity is a matter not of empirical survey or historical analysis, but of essentially failing 
self-identification, failing in the sense that the result is never something objectively 
there, but something actively and inter-subjectively constituted and re-produced.
5. Identity and energy
If identity is not something that can be “found” (and hence every claim to have found 
it necessarily is ideological), it is, curiously, not something that can be made either 
(and hence every proposal to “construct” it is a badly concealed form of domina-
tion over public discourse). The question is not whether “identity” can or should be 
“fixed” or “fluid”. The question has to do with the nature of what should be fixed or 
fluid. A possible paradigm from which this issue can be addressed, and which avoids 
both an essentialism that suggests a pre-existing core in every individual as well as 
a radical constructivism that fails to do justice to the attachment of people to “who 
they are”, is a perception of human beings as, primarily, bundles of energy, existing 
for a certain stretch of time and moving and acting in a series of more or less stable 
situations (their stability – negentropy – partly depends on themselves). One of the 
characteristics of such bundles of energy is their self-organization and their attempt 
to preserve themselves in whatever environment they find themselves. One of these 
environments is society, and a part of it is discursive space: in the interaction with 
others, each individual must in order to survive develop a “core” which, on the one 
hand, generates stability, but, on the other hand, has to have a considerable degree of 
flexibility; the outcome is what we usually call a “self”.
As we all know, both the “mix” of stability and flexibility and the amount of en-
ergy it takes to reproduce and, eventually, adapt this mix, varies strongly from one 
individual to the other. In addition, individuals are not simply “selves”, but relate to themselves as selves, i.e. they have their own self and that of others before them as 
objects that they can study, love, influence etc. From this angle, “identity” can be 
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conceived as the shortest description of a “self”. If we assume that in order to ex-
ist and interact with others people need an “identity” and if we further assume that 
this “identity” is neither pre-given nor ready-made, then what follows is the general 
hypothesis that “identity” comes into being and is acted upon in a process of mutual 
self-identification, i.e. of self-identification that can take the form of a quest for “what 
one really is” and other-identification that works as a “constitutive outside” (Mouffe 
2005: 15) for one’s own identity. And this process can take place under more or less 
free conditions: under some conditions it can end up in a celebration of difference 
for the sake of difference, under other conditions it can lead to the establishment of 
a national enemy, or even a external scapegoat such as the one yielded by the fabri-cated Jewish-Masonic Protocols of the Elders of Zion, in order to establish oneself 
as a “we”.
6. European identity – whose job?
The question about European identity (the assumption behind this question being that 
such an identity is important for Europe in order to be as much of a selfpreserving 
political community as is needed in the present-day world) is, in light of the above 
considerations, complicated by the fact that European identity consists of a mixture 
of at least three elements: a number of (a) national identities (to be more precise: con-
glomerates of discourses that generate and reproduce “national identities”); (b) a rath-
er high-brow intellectual tradition of “thinking about Europe” that works towards a 
cultural European identity; (c) EU-fostered political and social scientific projects that 
try to yield building blocks for the construction of a civil European identity. The dis-
tinction between these three elements, obviously, is analytical rather than empirical, 
but it helps to point to a number of problems:
1. the opposition between (a) and (b) explains much of the widespread perception of 
Europe as something of and for an intellectual and political elite – what Markku 
Kangaspuro labels a “new European nobility” (Kangaspuro 2007: 11);
2. the difference between (a), (b) and (c) serves to explain the anxiety of intellectu-
als that their ideas may be politicized: a case in point is the notion of Leitkultur
elaborated by Bassam Tibi (belonging to (b)) – much to his surprise and dislike 
(Tibi 2002: XIIff), it was quickly “usurped” by, on the one hand, nationalist 
agenda’s in Germany, the Netherlands and elsewhere (a) and, on the other hand, 
the EU (c) which tries to foster something like a European Leitkultur of which 
Don Quixote, Copernicus and Sherlock Holmes might be constitutive elements;
3. the difference between (a) and (c) reflects what seems to be one of the biggest 
problem of Europe today: the persistence and indeed growing presence of na-
tional discourses, national governments and national “interests” while their so-cioeconomic and political importance decreases. To my mind, this is an example 
of an ideology that articulates, in a compensatory manner, the opposite of social 
reality (see 1.v);
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4. the difference between b) and a) points to a tension between a free discussion, the 
outcome of which could, in principle, be that there is no given European identity 
and a goal-oriented discussion, the aim of which is to contribute to the coming-to-
be of a European identity. My preliminary conclusion with respect to this situation 
is that: (c) the EU should hold back in this matter, (b) intellectuals should realize 
that their discussion is a part of the identity (Europe as a discursive tradition) and 
(a) national identity discourse should be given time to wither away. My not so 
preliminary thesis is that if identity becomes an object of political preferences and 
priorities, it becomes ideology (a)/(c), while if it becomes the object of philosophi-
cal debate, it deconstructs itself (b).
7. European identity is what it is not!
Given these considerations, one may wonder what, then, could be positive sources of a 
European identity that does not fall prey to the afore-mentioned pitfalls (see 5). First of 
all, it would have to be based on a clear understanding of what identity as a discursive 
entity is – the question is not what is Polish identity (or any other), but what is “Polish 
identity” (see above 4 and 5). Secondly, it would have to be reflexive, i.e. acknowl-
edge that the very discourse is part of the identity – it is part of what it means to be 
European to approach such issues as a matter of discussion (rather than, for example, 
indoctrination, educational programs or other state policies). Thirdly, it would have to 
define itself in terms of its constitutive outsides. In an attempt to do this (engaging, 
that is, in what is pointed at in 6.b) and referring back to a habitual list of factors, that 
can form the identity of a polity’s “nation”, viz. shared, language, religion, ethnicity, 
political goals and history, I suggest the following elements.
i. With its present 23 official languages and 3 working languages, plus a large number 
of regional languages that claim their rights, the EU does not appear in a position 
to claim a language-based identity, even though Europe has the shared memory of 
Latin as a lingua franca, and even though a “reduced” form of English is quick-
ly becoming the second language of most Europeans (this shift is remarkable not 
only in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in, for example, France). To the ex-
tent to which the EU as a polity affirms itself and to the extent to which, within 
that setting – the setting of borders – economic and social, including demographic, 
integration takes place, English is bound to become the new lingua franca, espe-
cially of the “new European nobility” (Kangaspuro). But Étienne Balibar is right, I 
think, to claim that English will not be “la ‘langue de l’Europe’” because, on the 
one hand, it is a global lingua franca that exceeds Europe and, on the other hand, 
it does not replace the existing multitude of languages (Balibar 2001: 318)7. MORE 
IMPORTANT, therefore, and relevant as a constitutive outside, is the rejected no-
tion of mono-linguality: the point is not that any European should stop speaking 
7 Referring to Umberto Eco, Balibar suggests that the language of Europe is “la traduction (ou si l’on veut la 
métalangue concrète faite de toutes les équivalences et de toutes tentatives pour surmonter ‘l’intraduisible’ 
entre les idiomes)…” (loc.cit.).
17LIMES, 2009, Vol. 2, No. 1: 5–25
her or his native language, but that speaking only one language means to enclose 
oneself in an imagined polity, the “nation-state” that, in socio-economic and po-
litical terms, already is a thing of the past. To be European means to speak with 
other people in another language than your native one without identifying them 
as foreigners, but it also means to recognize that no single language can lay claim 
to being the European language. The empirical fact that English is assuming this 
role not only is a matter of pragmatism rather than of political domination, but also 
goes along with an impoverishing of that language itself (reduction of its idiomatic 
character, for example) that is, though in reverse direction, not incomparable with 
the splitting off of classical Latin from the forms of vulgar Latin that later became 
vernaculars. To be European thus means to give priority to communication over 
vernacular and it means to be bi- or multi-lingual.
ii. Religion, it seems to me, is not a viable element of a European identity either, 
because of the plurality and variety of religions in Europe’s past and present: 
Christianity in its three major forms (Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism) and 
many sub-forms, including new evangelical movements, Judaism, Islam, and a va-
riety of more or less religious world views such as Freemasonry, Anthroposophy, 
etc. MORE IMPORTANT and relevant as a constitutive outside is rejected mono-
religiosity either as the idea that Europe as a whole should have a single religion 
(which could then only be a re-unified Christianity), or as the idea that parts of 
Europe should have a national religion (Poland as Roman Catholic by nature, 
Romania and Greece as Orthodox, etc.) (van der Zweerde 2003, 2005). To be 
European thus means to acknowledge and defend that no “religion” can lay claim 
to a public impact that goes beyond the actual size and weight of its community of 
faithful.
iii. Ethnicity can even less serve as a common denominator than religion: to identify, 
e.g., Europe with Indo-Germanic or Indo-European ethnicity not only implies the 
exclusion of the substantial numbers of immigrants in most European countries as 
well as the “mixed offspring”, that results from their presence (and increasingly 
will), but also of such traditionally European ethnic groups such as the Finns or 
the Magyars. MORE IMPORTANT, again, and relevant as a constitutive outside, 
is the rejected idea of mono-ethnicity as a relevant political factor, an idea that has 
manifested itself in European history many times: in World War II, of course, but 
also in the ethnic cleansing campaigns in parts of former Yugoslavia and in the at-
titude towards Roma in some European countries. To be European thus means to 
reject the idea of ethnic purity.
iv. Political goals. The idea of a political community on the basis of shared political 
goals rather than religious, ethnic or linguistic factors (which, broadly speaking, 
was the agenda of Romantic counter-Enlightenment) has come most typically to 
the fore during and after the French Revolution of 1789, but is also present, for 
example, in the Confoederatio Helvetica. Interestingly, it there includes the right 
of religiously, ethnically and linguistically relatively homogeneous communities to 
retain a large degree of autonomy. While it is clear that Europeans generally share 
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a number of political convictions that can, roughly, be said to form the basis of 
the constitutional liberal democracy including Human Rights, which, in local vari-
ants, is the reality of most European countries (and, obviously, a condition for EU 
membership), it is also clear that a Habermasian Verfassungspatriottismus, which 
would build a European identity on the basis of these convictions, is too meagre 
and too rational. Moreover, Europe is still home to a broad spectrum of concep-
tions of political and socio-economic justice. MORE IMPORTANT, therefore, is 
the protest of Europeans against any monopoly on the interpretation of justice and, 
against forms of injustice including Human Rights violations, privileges, brute use 
of power, arbitrary decisions and systematic exclusion of individuals and groups, 
not only in those cases when they themselves are victims of it, but also when this 
affects others, including their political adversaries or people who are not their co-
citizens. It is not accidental that the actual violations of Human Rights, particularly 
of immigrants who yet have to be qualified as illegal, but have no way of protest-
ing against that verdict, have to be hidden from public attention. To be European 
thus means to have a historically informed sensitivity to injustice.
v. History is often pointed at as a factor that unites Europeans around a shared iden-
tity. In fact, the four elements just discussed can only be understood against the 
background of the history that Europeans share. However, it seems clear to me not 
only that this “shared” history must include the colonial pasts of many European 
countries (José Casanova)8 and, obviously, many other black pages, but also that 
this history is perceived differently and, fundamentally so, from one European 
country to another. Out of the many possible examples I give only three: the per-
ception by Czechs and Russians of the events of 1968, the perception by victims 
and perpetrators of the occupation of European countries (Poland, but also France 
or the Netherlands) by Nazi Germany, and the perception by Croatians, Bosnians 
and Serbs of the war in former Yugoslavia. It usually suffices to cast a quick glance 
into locally used history school books to get an idea. What Europeans thus have 
in common, is not a single shared history, but the presence of a multitude of often 
diametrically opposed narratives of their past: this profound difference of opinion 
is a vital part of their Schicksalsgemeinschaft. One problem, it seems to me, is that 
while this is easy to assess at the level of intellectual debate (see 6.b above), it is 
rejected as not only potentially, but indeed actually undermining national identity 
(6.a) and attempts to work towards a common perception (6.c) will invariably strike 
as artificial. The only real “remedy” to this problem is of course historical time it-
self, but it can be assisted by the attempts, within that time, by historians to write 
a history of Europe (e.g. Davies 1997) rather than of a multitude of Fatherlands, 
and it can be fostered by, for example, educational projects that compare history 
school books. Still, it would and ought to be an illusion to think that one happy 
day all children in all schools in all European countries would be using the same 
8 José Casanova pointed this out in a yet unpublished paper at a conference, “Politik, Religion und Markt: die 
Rückkehr der Religion als Anfrage an den politisch-philosophischen Diskurs der Moderne”, in Innsbruck, 
Austria, 5–7 June 2008.
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history book. MORE IMPORTANT, therefore, and relevant as a constitutive outside, 
is the rejected idea of a mono-logical account of history be it national or European. 
To be European thus means, among others, to be aware of the fact that, for example, 
Frenchmen and Germans have a different perception of the Vichy regime just like 
Germans, Poles, Jews, and Roma have different perceptions of Oswięcim/Auschwitz.
8. A “weak” identity
What unites these five items, first of all, is something that arguably is a part of the 
“core” of a European identity: the acceptance of plurality and the non-acceptance of 
this plurality as a ground for discord. As Hermann Lübbe stated, “das Hauptcharakter-
istikum europäischer Identität, kulturelle und politische Vielfalt namentlich in engen 
Räumen, wird im Rahmen der einheitsstiftenden erweiterten Union noch aufdring-
licher sein als bisher” (Lübbe 2001: 222). To be sure, it is always possible to undo 
plurality, either by forced assimilation or by some form of “homogenization”, but one 
of the effects of the sheer size of the EU is, it seems to me, that no single ethnic or 
religious group will be in a position to impose such a policy (just like, at the politi-
cal level, the possibility of the domination of European politics by one or a few large 
members – in the recent past: the axis Bonn-Paris – becomes less likely with each 
new member). All this leads to the “proposal” of a European slogan that does not, as 
is the case now, point to “Unity in Diversity”/“Einheit in der Vielfalt”, but to Plurality in Unity.
A second common dominator of these five items is their “negativity”. They are 
more easily formulated in terms of what distinguishes them from their constitutive 
outside, i.e. from what they are not, than in terms of what they are positively. This 
negativity is, I think, very important, because to realize it fully is to become skeptical 
of attempts by European authorities to work constructively at the creation of a positive 
identity (6.c). The resistance that such attempts meet with – this resistance is another 
feature that Europeans have in common – is explicable not only in terms of the con-
tent of such identity, but also of the artificial nature of the very attempt.
A third element that the five elements have in common, related to the negativ-
ity just alluded to, is the fact that each of them draws a line or points to a limit. If 
Europe’s political borders are primarily meant not to keep the citizens in, but to limit 
and control the access of “foreigners”, the lines drawn by the potentially constitu-
tive elements of a European identity just outlined are also meant to keep something 
out: nationally motivated monolingualism, unwarranted claims by religious commu-
nities and organizations, ethnic purification or homogenization, monopoly on justice 
and a mono-logic historical narrative. This is important, it seems to me, because this 
makes it much easier to combine European and national identity, something that many 
Europeans continue to attach great value to. As surveys indicate, the vast majority of 
Europeans either consider themselves to have only a national identity or a national 
plus European identity – the two categories cover well over 80% in most countries – 
while minorities around 10% claim a European plus national identity and very small 
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numbers “only European” (Buonanno, Deakin 2004: 87). This does not necessarily 
pose a problem: if “national” and “European” are not perceived as mutually exclusive 
identities, they are compatible (Wiesner 2007: 42–46) – though not necessarily in a 
harmonious manner.
On the whole and for the reasons just indicated, I venture the hypothesis that a
European identity must be a weak and primarily “negative” identity, marked more 
by its constitutive outsides than by its “positive” elements. Understanding this reflex-
ively, I suggest, that to write about European identity in this manner and to discuss 
the borders of Europe is to take part in the shaping of a European identity already. It 
is, to return to a notion discussed above (under 4), one way of organizing one’s intel-
lectual energy around a core. The answer to the question “What does it mean to be 
a European?” is not primarily found in theoretical deliberations but in practices and 
in ways of doing – it is, to put it in Hegelian terms, more a matter of Sittlichkeit than 
of Moralität. A typical, much less high-brow example of this is the remarkable fact 
that though attempts to build a European identity around such things as an anthem9,
a flag and other symbols may have failed due to artificiality (Neumann 2007: 24), the 
European flag gains “identity potential” when it is used elsewhere, e.g. in the USA 
or in Russia, and the everyday use of the euro as the EU’s currency has a clear, long-
term effect on the “sense” of Europeans – a generation is taking shape that thinks 
European in terms of what they have in their pockets.
9. No civilizationalism!
From this attempt at a delineation of a “weak” European identity (under 6–8), a cri-
tique can be derived of the Huntingtonian paradigm. It can be summarized by the thesis that Europe does not possess – or is covered by – a single civilization and that 
this constitutes not its weakness, but its strength. This is not to say, that Samuel Hun-
tington did not have a point: his conception does point to tensions, and even if they 
are more complex than his idea of fault lines between civilizations suggests, such fault 
lines can be found. However, there are at least three good reasons against a simplified 
application of his civilizational paradigm to Europe:
It suggests more homogeneity than is actually in place: not only is Europe as a 
whole a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual cultural space that includes, 
e.g., Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Turkey, but also the predominant European pol-
ity, the EU, contains countries with a predominantly Catholic, Protestant or Orthodox 
religious tradition, and it will contain in the foreseeable future, at least one predomi-
nantly Muslim country (Bosnia-Herzegovina), it includes highly “secularized” as well 
as highly traditionally Christian countries. There is not a fault line running across 
Europe, but Europe is built on a plurality of “inner fault lines”.
9 For a hilariously funny analysis of the EU anthem, the “Ode to Joy” in Ludwig van Beethoven’s 9th Sym-
phony, including the role of the marcia Turca, see Slavoj Žižek 2008, p. 270–274.
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It puts civilization before culture, thus suggesting a level of objectivity that is not 
matched by the cultural process that takes place within any society, and that stems 
from the fact that society is as much a self-constituting subject as it is an “object”. 
There are, of course, objective sides to every society but they derive their meaning 
and the possibility of their future changes from the fact that the members of that so-
ciety, from average citizens to politicians, relate to these objective sides – culture is 
a general name for the way in which people relate actively to the circumstances and 
realities they find themselves surrounded by.
Ideas have the capacity to be working ideas (Moтрошилова 1991: 6), a fact which 
explains why intellectuals can try to develop ideas that have an impact on social real-
ity. Huntington’s idea of civilizations and of fault lines is an example of this because, 
rather than being an objective, empirical description of social facts, it is a discursive-
ly embedded concept which, if accepted, tends to work as a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Huntington’s later book, Who are we?, which is an attempt to delineate (draw limits!) 
American identity, leaves a little doubt as to his culture-political agenda (Huntington 
2004: 8–12, and passim). A single intellectual, with respect to these formative issues, 
who is claiming “This is how it is!” has already changed “how it is”.
10. No neutrality!
It follows from this last example, that, at least in the social sciences and the humani-
ties, scientific research and academic discussion are never politically neutral or in-
nocent. To do research in a seemingly neutral manner is therefore either to run away 
from responsibility or to engage in ideology, i.e. to make a concealed political move. 
To be European, for example, means to be aware of the inner potentialities of Europe’s 
cultural and intellectual heritage – including totalitarianism that has seduced grand 
thinkers like Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre, György Lukács, Carl Schmitt and 
Giovanni Gentile. Without denying the specific responsibility and guilt on some parts, 
we can safely state that all European nations have struggled or are still struggling, 
with their 20th century past. If this is true, what Europeans have in common, is not 
only the experience of a nasty, brutish and short 20th century (Eric Hobsbawm), but 
also the recognized necessity to come to terms with it, to engage in Vergangenheits-
bewältigung. Even if they have succeeded in this to varying degrees, one can argue 
that the readiness to come to terms with the less appealing parts of one’s history with-
out putting the blame exclusively on “the Other” is a positive part of the European 
heritage. The pressure on Turkey to recognize the Armenian genocide is, I believe, 
more important precisely in the sense of a requirement to an open, enlightened society 
to deal with its past, than in the sense of a recognition of a particular guilt. Within 
Europe, Germany has been exemplary in this respect, which appears, for example, 
from the stark contrast between German Wiedergutmachung with respect to Poland 
or to Jewry, and the position post-Soviet Russia takes with respect to the systematic 
destruction, during roughly 40 years, of the economies and civil societies of Poland or 
Hungary, not to mention Lithuania or Estonia. This, arguably, disqualifies Russia as a 
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European country on precisely this point. What is at stake, in the process of coming to 
terms with Europe’s past is not the answer to the question “Who is to blame?”, but the 
communicative process of the coming-to-terms itself, the coming-to-be of a reflexive 
community. This community, paradoxically, is stronger if it does not arrive at a single 
answer. The German Historikerstreit thus is a more significant contribution to a Euro-
pean discursive space when it ends undecided than if it is solved.
The fact that Europeans, for more than half a century, have asked themselves and 
each other which have been the real causes of the tragedies that soaked Europe in 
blood, without finding a clear-cut answer to this question, is not a failure but, para-
doxically, a success. This implies that intellectual responsibility is a matter of draw-
ing clear lines: we, Europeans may not know who we are or what we want, but we do 
know very well what we are not and what we do not want.
11. Back to citizenship: instead of the conclusions
What is needed today is a political philosophy that matches European realities
rather than fears and dreams. Neither a mere philosophy “about politics”10, nor 
one that designs ideal models, but one that invokes and revives the direct link be-
tween philosophy and politics, that has been constitutive ever since Plato and Ar-
istotle – and, not to be forgotten, Democritus. Too often is European philosophy 
determined either by wishful thinking about a common European Schicksalsge-
meinschaft or by fearful thinking about the loss of political autonomy and cultural 
identity. Those who, like Jacques Derrida, dared to think beyond the boundaries of 
their national tradition, often jumped to a cosmopolitanism that does retain large parts 
of the European intellectual legacy, esp. of Kantian Enlightenment, but loses sight 
of the complex socio-economic and political reality that is Europe. As a result, this 
cosmopolitanism often ends in fruitless repetitive discussions about whether or not 
Kantian “eternal peace” is a real possibility or not. My suggestion is that a focus on 
the European polity is a way out of this dead-lock: we can make better sense of the 
idea of cosmopolitan citizenship, if the EU makes it a stated goal of its foreign policy, 
that every world inhabitant should be citizen of a polity which is based on a rule of 
law and that has Human Rights, included in its bill of civil rights. The number of 
such polities then is a different issue; one that can but must not be the focus of our 
concern. It is imaginable that, in the very long run, the whole world will become 
“Europe”, just as it once was “America”. In that case Immanuel Kant’s rational-
ist dream would get close to coming true. It is more likely, however, that, for a 
long time to come, Europe will be one among a plurality of larger and smaller 
polities – among which it will be one of the larger and more powerful blocks. 
To be such a polity it requires not, I venture, the fixation of an identity or the self-
satisfactory celebration of a civilization, but the drawing of borders, contestable and 
10 Here and elsewhere, I employ a triple definition of political philosophy: philosophy of politics, philosophy of 
the political and philosophy, that realizes its own political nature – here I have in mind, primarily, the third 
meaning.
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liable to future change, but clear-cut as borders in order to create the space in which, 
among others, discussion about European culture, civilization, identity, and politics 
can continue and “flourish”.
What we need to be concerned about most of all is the inside of the European 
polity. The “political state of Europe” is a hybrid mixture of “old” nation-states 
and a trans-national juridical-political structure that has partly replaced them. Also, 
this political state of Europe is markedly less democratic than the nation-states that 
form it: to the extent to which the trans-national European “state” holds real politi-
cal power (and it does through legislation, regulation, European Court for Human 
Rights etc.), its “democratic deficit” means a net loss of democratic control, even if 
it is “the best developed example of a democratically organized political entity on 
a transnational level” (Wiesner 2007: 38). If it is true that, on the one hand, many 
current social, economic and environmental problems require European rather than 
local solutions – think of labour market, drugs policies, immigration, emancipa-
tion of minorities, the financial crisis of 2008 – and the ideal of political power, as 
opposed to social and economic power, requires more rather than less state capac-
ity at EU level; and on the other hand, national governments for obvious reasons 
tend to focus on national rather than on common European interests; then it is clear 
that a more active European citizenship is required. There is nothing new about the 
transition from the status of subject – which Europeans all are – to that of citizen 
which, formally at least, we also are. But there is something crucially new about 
shifting active citizenship from the national to the European level, giving rise to 
European public space, European civil society etc. Policies and discourse that seek 
to foster such developments by reference to a shared European identity forget one 
thing: every society is divided in itself, and contains antagonistic relations between 
different social, economic, cultural etc. groups. Every polity, therefore, must some-
how address these antagonisms by suppressing, canalizing or transposing them to the political arena. Every democratic society is disharmonious by nature, if and 
because it succeeds in transforming all forms of societal antagonism into agonistic 
political struggle. Therefore, a European “civil identity” that is to match European 
societal reality, will not be a unitary and homogeneous identity that is supplemen-
tary to a national identity, the homogeneous identity of which is just as illusionary. 
On the contrary, such an “identity” will be heterogeneous and diverse; it will cover 
a plurality of perceptions, preferences, and ideals. It will be plural, not as a first step 
towards unity, but in its core, and it will be divided, but not along national lines. If 
they want to make a difference to the European reality that already is their socio-
economic, intellectual and cultural environment, Europeans will have to transpose 
their political ideals to a European public sphere and European political arena that 
comes into existence, albeit not with immediate visibility, in and through the very 
process of transposing.
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VIENINGUMO PLIURALUMAS: EUROPIETIŠKASIS TAPATUMAS IR 
EUROPIETIŠKASIS PILIETIŠKUMAS
Evert van der Zweerde
Santrauka
Tolesnė „Europos“ integracija ir svarbiausia – vis dažnesnės „politinės dis-
kusijos“ šia tema yra remiamos ir skatinamos. Vadovaujamasi ne romantine ar 
idealistine pozityvaus europietiškojo tapatumo vizija, bet Europos ekonominės, 
socialinės ir ekologinės integracijos vertinimu bei požiūriu, esą ji politiškai at-
silieka demokratinio valdymo ir pilietiškumo atžvilgiais. Tariamai nesibaigian-
čios diskusijos Europos tapatumo, ribų, vieningumo, civilizacijos ir panašiais 
klausimais nėra ta problema, kuri jau turi būti išspręsta, bet iš esmės sudaro to-
kios Europos, kokia ji yra, pagrindą: vieningumo pliuralumas vietoj „pliuralu-
mo vieningumo“, kaip skelbia vienas iš oficialių Europos Są jungos (ES) lozun-
gų. Nūdienės socialinės, ekonominės ir aplinkosaugos problemos reikalauja eu-
ropietiškų sprendimų ir kur kas aktyvesnio europietiškojo pilietiškumo. Tačiau 
norint, kad europietiškasis pilietinis tapatumas atitiktų europietišką ją socialinę 
tikrovę, jis neturi būti bendras ir homogeniškas, bet, atvirkščiai, heterogeniškas 
ir įvairialypis, apimantis daugelį suvokimo perspektyvų, privilegijų ir idealų. 
Jis turi būti pliuralus, bet ne kaip pirmas žingsnis vieningumo link; jis turi būti 
iš esmės dalus, tačiau ne pagal valstybių sienas. 
Reikšminiai žodžiai: pilietiškumas, „civilizacionalizmas“, diskursyvi erdvė, 
europietiškoji integracija, tapatumas, pliuralumas. 
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